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The Tribunal's approach towards the exclusion of competitors by a dominant firm
In terms of s 8(d)(i) of the Act, a dominant firm is prohibited from engaging in the exclusionary act of "requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a competitor", unless the firm concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act. 1 In EU competition law and in South African competition law, the dominance itself is not prohibited, only shown that SAA had actively sought to exclude rivals. On the Tribunal's approach to s 8(d)(i) of the Act, the enquiry as to a contravention is a factual enquiry as to the effect of an act on competition in the relevant market.
Intention to exclude competitors or the effect of exclusion?
By comparison, the approach towards the abuse of dominance in the EU is reflected in the European Commission's decision in the AstraZeneca case. 6 In this case, following a six-year investigation, the European Commission ("EC") found that AstraZeneca had abused its dominant position on a number of national markets in the European Economic Area ("EEA") for oral prescription proton pump inhibitors ("PPIs"). AstraZeneca owns the successful drug, Losec, used to treat stomach ulcers. AstraZeneca maintained a marketing authorization, was only due to expire some time after the end of patent protection for the capsule form.
The EC stated that, at the time, generic products could only be marketed and parallel importers only obtain import licenses if there was an existing reference market authorization for the original corresponding product (Losec). The purpose of a market authorization is the right to sell a medicine, and not to exclude competitors. Unlike patents, SPCs and data exclusivity, market authorizations are not intended to reward innovation, and the finding of an abuse should not, therefore, affect incentives to innovate. The relevant EU rules on marketing authorizations have since changed so that such an abuse cannot be repeated.
Unlike the Tribunal's approach in the SAA case and in others, 9 the intention of the dominant firm appeared to play a key role in the EC's finding. 10 The EC noted in its official press releases dealing with its decision, that there was a pattern of intentional misleading representations by AstraZeneca as part of a centralized and coordinated strategy with the aim of acquiring or preserving SPCs to prevent or delay generic market entry. As such, the firm was found to amount to an infringement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. The EC imposed a penalty of € 60 million for AstraZeneca's infringement. 10 The EC's decision was not published at the time of writing and it may be the case that evidence of foreclosure of the market to rivals was considered more closely in reaching the conclusion but not stated in detail in the EC's press release.
constituted an exclusionary act.
In relation to the anti-competitive effect of the exclusionary act, the Tribunal found that the effect of the anti-competitive conduct on the structure of the market was to inhibit rivals from The Tribunal found that SAA's incentive schemes caused two competitive harms. The first was harm to consumers, since the effect of the incentive schemes was that in the short run consumers fly on more expensive tickets and at less preferable times than if ticket offerings by travel agents were unbiased. The second competitive harm was that SAA was able to perpetuate its existing dominance, restrict new entry into the market and inhibit its existing rivals from expanding in the market.
As far as a subjective enquiry into the conduct of a dominant firm is concerned, this plays a part in the Tribunal's approach but only after a finding of a contravention, when a determination is made as to the penalty to be applied. In terms of the Act, a firm that has infringed s 8(d) of the Act may be liable for an administrative penalty of up to 10% of the firm's annual turnover in South Africa and its exports from South Africa during the firm's preceding financial year. 16 When determining an appropriate penalty, the Tribunal is required to have regard to the following factors:
• the nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention;
• any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention;
• the behaviour of the respondent;
• the market circumstances in which the contravention took place;
• the level of profit derived from the contravention;
• the degree to which the respondent has cooperated with the Commission and the Tribunal; and
• whether the respondent has previously been found in contravention of the Act.
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It is only at this stage of the enquiry that subjective considerations may be taken into account. In the SAA case, the Tribunal's penalty of R 45 million was the largest imposed by the South African authorities to date although it was not the maximum penalty that could have been 
